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LEXINGTON, KY., MAY, 1918.

NO. 5

PRIVATE RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION.*
By Frank J. Goodnow.t

In order to obtain an adequate understanding of the private
rights of individuals on the one hand and of the extent of administrative discretion on the other hand, it is necessary to examine in
some detail both the methods of administrative action and the judicial
remedies which are open to the individual claiming himself aggrieved
by that action.
Administrative methods and judicial remedies will on such an
examination be found to be much less dependent on constitutional
limitations than is perhaps ordinarily supposed. These limitations
are, 'as interpreted by the courts, directed rather to legislative than
administrative action. They prevent the legislature, for example,
from declaring that to be a nuisance which in the opinion of the court
is not a nuisance, but once the character of nuisance is admitted,
they permit of the most drastic action in its abatement on the part
of the administration. Constitutional limitations do, of course, indirectly limit administrative activity in so far as that activity is
based upon legislation, since the legislature may not grant to administrative authorities a power which it does not in itself possess. But,
apart from such a limitation, constitutional provisions do not seriously
affect many forms of administrative activity. We may, therefore,
*Address prepared for American Bar Association.
tAuthor of several works on Administrative Law.
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almost leave out of consideration the private rights provisions of
American constitutions in the treatment of our subject.
I have said that our attention must be directed both to administrative methods and to the judicial methods available. Let us now
take up oie by one the most important methods by which administrative authorities act, and consider at the same time the remedies open
to the individual who deems himself aggrieved by that action.
I.

ADM1INISTRATIVE REGULATIONS.

The first method of administrative action to which I wish to
call attention is that of regulation. The characteristic of this method
is that it attempts to affect the relations of private individuals through
the promulgation of rules of conduct of general application. In general, it may be said that few, if any, administrative authorities have
in accordance with American law the right to issue such regulations
in the absence of statutory authorization to that effect. (Potts vs.
Breen, 167 Ill. 67.) On the other hand, it is just as true that there
are a great number of administrative authorities to which such a
power of regulation has been given by legislation. This is so, notwithstanding it is the theory of our law that our legislatures may not delegate legislative power. For our courts have commonly held constitutional statutes granting to administrative authorities the power to
regulate the details which must be regulated in order that much legislation may be made really effective. (Buttfield vs. Stranahan, 192
U. S. 470; Health Department of City of New York vs. Rector, etc.
of Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32.) It is also constitutional for the
legislature to delegate to administrative authorities the power to impose criminal penalties for the violation of administrative regulations. (O'Hover vs. Montgomery, 120 Tenn.,448.) And it is often
the case that a provision of the penal code or some other statute
specifically provides penalties for the violation of administrative ordinances. Indeed, without any such provision of law it is competent
for local corporations both to issue local ordinances or by-laws and
to provide penalties in the nature of fines which may be recovered in
an action for debt. (Mayor of Mobile vs. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137.)
Where a provision of statute clearly authorizes an administrative authority to promulgate such regulations, it is seldom the case
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that its discretion in the exercise of its regulatory povers is subject
to any control. Of course, as has been said, the legislature may not
delegate to an administrative authority a power which it does not itself possess. Any attempt on the part of an administrative authority
to enforce a regulation which it has not the power to make may in
the proper method be rendered nugatory by the courts. But so long
as an administrative authority keeps within the power which has been
constitutionally delegated to it, its discretion in the exercise of its
power of regulation is not subject to effective control. I- is seldom
that a regulation, to be valid, needs the approval of any superior
administrative authority. It is almost never the case that a regulation issued by an administrative authority is laid before the legislature for its action, as frequently happens in Great Britain. The only
possible control which may be exercised over the discretion of an administrative authority in the issue of regulations is exercised by the
courts through their power to declare void as unreasonable a regulation which is not clearly within the power possessed by the authority
issuing it. As in not a few instances the power of regulation is granted in general terms, it is often within the jurisdiction of the courts
thus to declare void as being unreasonable a regulation of an administrative authority. Where, however, the power to promulgate the particular kind of regulation at issue is certain, the question of its reasonableness is regarded as settled. The courts may not declare it void
as unreasonable any more than they may declare a statute of the legislature void for the same reason. (O'Hover vs. Montgomery, 120,
Tenn. 448, 467.)
We may say, then; that for most practical purposes:
First: Administrative authorities may and do possess wide powers of regulation; and
Second: The exercise of the regulatory power of administrative
authorities is not, in very many important cases, subject to an effective control.
Both of these statements are true, notwithstanding the fact thati
these regulations are frequently adopted without any public hearings,
by authorities organized in such a way that debate with regard to'
these regulations is impossible. The result is -that it is not infre-
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quently the case that the only view which receives expression in ordinances or regulations issued is the official view.
Furthermore, it is not seldom the case that regulations are
adopted and enforced without adequate publication. For it is by
no means clear that the law requires publication as a necessary prerequisite to the validity of an ordinance or regulation.
The individual is thus not sufficiently protected, either through
the procedure required as a preliminary to the adoption and issue
of regulations, or through the methods of control provided against
the arbitrary use of discretion by administrative authorities in the
exercise of their powers of regulation.
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE .ACTION OF INDIVIDUAL APPLICATION.

The second method of administrative action consists in the taking
of action which affects some particular individual case.
The number of these orders or decisions of individual applicatioi. as they are sometimes generically called, islegiin and their
variety is very great. We may perhaps, however, attempt to classify
them according as they affect what the law regards on the one hand
as ftights, and on the other as privileges. In the case of such actions
of individual application as affect rights we may distinguish orders
that something be done from decisions as to questions of fact or of law.
In the case, however, of administrative action as to privileges, most,
if not all, of the cases will fall under the head of decisions.
A.

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AFFECTING P1RIVATE RIGHTS.

1. In'Matters of Taxation.
In matters of taxation,, administrative action of individual application may, if we analyze administrative action generally, be said to
be taken with the purpose of expressing in the concrete ease the will
of the state. Thus a statute may provide in a general way the taxes
which all taxpayers of a certain defined class shall pay. This statute
may furthermore be supplemented by administrative regulations such
as the detailed and complex, if not incomprehensible, regulations
with regard to the federal income tax. But no matter how detailed
such statutes and regulations may be, it is impossible for any par-
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ticular individual taxpayer to kmow what amount in dollars and cents
of tax he will have to pay before a decision has been reached by the
competent administrative authorities. Such a decision in almost all
American tax laws is called an assessment or an appraisal.
The protection of private rights against the exercise of arbitrary administrative discretion is in tax, as in most other matters,
dependent first upon the procedure which must be f6llowed by taxassessing and collecting authorities; and, second, upon the judicial
remedies which axe open to the taxpayer. The general rule of our
constitutional law is that the due process of law clause requires that
some time during the assessment or collectidn proceedings the taxpayer must have the right to be heard. If such an opportunity is
accorded to him during the administrative assessment proceedings,
compliance with the conptitutional requirement has been had and
there is no constitutional necessity to provide a judicial remedy, or
even an administrative appeal. (Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.
vs. Backus, 154 U. S. 421.) In this case it is said by Mr. Justice
Brewer: "A hearing before judgment with full opportunity to present all the evidence and the argument which' the party deems important is all that can be adjudged to be vital. Rehearings and new
trials are not essential to due process of law, either in judicial or
administrative proceedings. One hearing, if ample, before judgment
satisfies the demand of the Constitution in this respect." What has
been said is, of course, true only as to the valuation of a taxable object,
such as property, income, franchise, or import. It would probably
be unconstitutional, though this is not absolutely certain, for the
legislative authority to cut off the 'judicial remedy with regard to
legal questions involving liability to taxation. Certainly such action
would be unconstitutional if the attempt were made to deprive the
courts of the power to determine the constitutionality of the action
of the legislature in tax matters.
The law, however,- sometimes provides something in, the nature
of a judicial remedy in the case of mere assessments or appraisals.
In some states, as in New York, the writ of certiorari to review a determination has been made applicable to many tax assessment cases.
In other states there is some form of statutory appeal to the courts
from tax assessments. In general, however, it may' be said that ap-
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peals to the courts with regard to the question of fact involved in
assessment, appraisal or valuation proceedings are not permitted.
The exercise of arbitrary administrative discretion in tax proceedings is perhaps carried the furthest in the law of the federal
government. Here, as a result of statute as interpreted by the courts;
practically every judicial remedy which elsewhere is open to the individual is cut off with the exception of an action for money had
and received, brought after involuntary payment under protest
against the tax collector. (Cary vs. Curtis, 3 How. U. S. 236; Cheesebrough vs. United States, 192 U. S. 253; Wright vs. Blakeslee, 101
U. S. 175.) And on such suits mere questions of valuation not involving questions of law affecting taxability may not usually be considered. Thus, the customs law has often specifically provided that
the appraisal of imported goods for customs revenue purposes, when
made by the competent administrative authorities, is final. (Passavant vs. United States, 148 U. S. 214.)
The administrative decision fixing the value for purposes of taxation of a taxable object has in some cases also the characteristic
of an order that something be done in the future, that is, that a certain sum of money be paid. Where this is not thd case, this decision
is made the basis of such an order. The amount to be paid is determined as the result of a simple mathematical calculation consisting
in the multiplication of the ascertained assessment valuation by the
tax rate. It is frequently the case that this order is executed by
summary administrative process, and no suit in a court for the collection of the tax is provided in the law., Such summary administrative proceedings have~been held by our courts to be the due process of law required by the Constitution. (McMillen vs. Anderson,
.95 U. S. 37; Palmer vs. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, affirming 102 N. Y.
176; Commonwealth vs. Byrne, 20 Grattan Va. 165.)
Where no provision for even an administrative hearing has been
made by the law, the courts havy sometimes, even in the absence
of statute to that effect, permitted the individual taxpayer prior "to
the collection of the tax to have an injunction to restrain its collection, or subsequent to its collection to have an action against the
collector for money had and received. Due process of law would
seem to make necessary the existence of some such remedy. The in-
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junction, however, is only very cautiously used (Dows vs. City of
Chicago, 11 Wall. 108), and is absolutely prohibited by Congress
in the case of the taxes levied by the United States (Snyder vs. Marks,
109 U. S. 189), while the action for money had and received is subject to so many limitations that its effectiveness as a tax remedy is
greatly curtailed.
Finally, all such judicial proceedings are customarily regarded
as collateral rather than direct proceedings, so far as concerns an
assessment made after a hearing. Where a hearing has been provided and the decision on such a hearing has not been attacked directly
in the manner provided by law, the court will consider in these collateral proceedings only questions involving taxable jurisdiction
(Palmer vs. MeMahon, 133 U. S.660.)
The result is that the individual is, by the American law of
taxation, quite commonly subjected to the arbitrary discretion of
the tax authorities so far as concerns- questions of assessment valuation, and, because of the inadequacy of the judicial remedies available, finds it difficult, if not impossible in many cases, to secure a
jud cial review even of questions of law. This is particularly true
of the smaller taxpayers, who, under the present methods of judicial
proceedings, cannot afford the expense of an appeal to the courts
against what they believe to be the unauthorized and illegal decisions
of tax officers.
2. In Matters of Police.
The gradual change in the United States from an agricultural
to an industrial life, and the great increase of. urban commnities,
have presented ptoblems for the solution of which little if any provision was made in the common or statute law which we Americans
received from England. English methods of dealing with what have
been spoken of as "matters of police" were based on the law of
nuisance. This law differentiated private from public nuisances, and
apparently authorized any. one to abate a public nuisance, while only
one specially injured might abate a private nuisance. It did not
make effective provision for anything in the nature of a public
authority whose duty it was to promote the public safety and convenience. Indeed, almost the only ways in which public authorities
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participated in nuisance abatements were, first, in the indictment and
prosecution of public nuisances; and, second, in determining, in the
case nuisances had been privately abated, what were the rights of the
parties concerned. For individuals who attempted to exercise their
legal 'rights in the abatement of private or public nuisances did so
at the risk of baving the courts hold that what had been abated was
not a nuisance.
The whole English law on this subject is a good example of
those methods of self-help which are characteristic of rather primitive
social conditions and of an undeveloped legal system based on individualistic rather than social conceptions.
The English law, as we inherited it, was naturally unfitted for
the complex relations of modern industrial and urban life. Soon
after American social conditions began to change, attempts were
made to change the law. The first attempts were made in the City
of New York about the middle of the nineteenth century. The first
point of attack was the method of abatement of nuisances by criminal
proceedings. Such proceedings bad shown themselves to be absolutely
ineffective. The ordinary petit juries had been so regardful of private rights where'the interests of the public were involved that the
maintenance through existing methods of reasonably sanitary conditions was impossible. A law was, therefore, passed providing for
an administrative sanitary authority-the board of health-whose
duty it should be to preserve the public health. To this body was
given the power, after granting a hearing to individuals who might
be affected by its orders, to declare specific conditions to be nuisances,
and to abate them. The constitutionality of this method of action was
bitterly contested in the courts, but was upheld, the courts taking
the view that the administrative hearing provided was due process
of law, and that one who had not taken advantage of the opportuniity to be heard before the board of health provided by law could not,
in a subsequent collateral proceeding, such as an injunction to restrain the board of health from enforcing its order, attack that order
as invalid. (Mletropolitian Board of Health vs. Heister, 37 N. Y.
661 (1868).) But for some reason or other the example set by New
York has not been generally followed throughout the country, nor
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has the procedure thus provided for the abatement of nuisances been
commonly applied eyen in the State of New York itself.
The methods commonly adopted in this country for the preservation of the public health are adaptations of the old, primitive English "methods. They seldom provide for anything in the nature of a
hearing before sanitary authorities as to the actual existence of the
nuisance of which complaint may be made. (See People ex rel.
Copcutt vs. Board of Health, 140 N. Y. 1; North Amcri,.an Cold
Storage Co. vs. City of Chicago, 211 U. S. 306.) They are almost
always based upon the idea of summary abatement, a sanitary officer
possessing in theory only the powers possessed by private individuals
under the early English law. There is thus little opportunity to
disti.-guish between a decision as to the existence of a state of facts,
i. e., the presence of a nuisance, and an order that something be done,
i. c., that the nuisance be abated.
Often the law does not require even notice to the parties affected
(Health Department vs. Trinity Church. 145 N. Y. 32), though such
notice is frequently given as a matter of fact.
These very summary and arbitrary proceedings h'ave, however,
uiua!ly been accompanied by such extensive judicial remedies that
the effectiveness of nuisance removal proceedings would have been
seriously diminished had the edurts not applied the remedies with
considerable caution, and had the application to the eourts for the
exercise of their powers of review not involved an expense too great
to he justified except in the most important eases.
The most noticeable points with regard to which the courts have
insisted on their powers of review are two:
In the first place, they have held, as has been said, that neither
the legislature nor any administrative authority to which the legislature has delegated power may declare that to he a nuisance which
is not a nuisance. (Evansville vs. Miller, 146 Ind. 613, Yates vs.
Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497.) This means, in plain English. however
the courts may disguise and becloud the issue, that the legislative
determination as to what conditions are nuisances is subject to judicial review. This rule of law is, however beneficent its operation
may be and however wise the courts may have been in applying it,
inconsistent with our general theory of legislative discretion. Its
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application, furthermore, has, in conditions such as have existed in
New York City, been a serious hindrance to the progress of reasonable social reform. The decision of the New York Court of Appeals,
for example, that the law prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in
tenement houses was unconstitutional has very seriously hampered
the administration of the public health law in that city, as well as
made difficult, if not impossible, the regulation of sweated labor.
In the second place, the courts have claimed in the exercise of
their powers of review the right to determine whether health and
public safety authorities have acted within their jurisdiction, even
where such jurisdiction has been dependent upon the existence of
states of facts the existence of which can be determined only as
the result of investigation by scientific experts. Thus, for example,
a board of health may have the right under the law to kill all horses
having glanders. They examine certain horses by their experts, and
determine that these horses have glanders. The court, in a suit for
trespass against the health officers, determines by a jury that the
horses did not have glanders, and gives judgment against the health
officers. (Miller vs. Horton, 152 Mass. 540.) In one rather famous
instance the case as reported would seem to show that the jury determined that the disease which brought about action by the health.
officers, that is, anthrax, did not exist, although those officers had,
as a result of a bacteriological examination, reached a contrary conclusion. (Lowe vs. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151.)
If the courts exercised with great freedom the powers which they
thus claim, an effective health administration would be impossible.
Fortunately, they do not do so. On the contrary, they are very apt
to regard the action complained of, except in somewhat extraordinary
and aggravated cases, as within the jurisdiction of the health or other
authorities. (Cf. Raymond vs. Fish, 51 Conn. 80; Salem vs. Eastern
R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 431.) Once that is admitted, there is no remedy
open to the individual. He is almost an outlaw. Alterations in his
property involving great expense may be ordered, although he has
never had an opportunity to be heard. (Health Dep't vs. Trinity
Church, 145 N. Y. 32.) He may be deprived of his liberty on the
supposition that he has a contagious disease which, as a matter of
fact, he may not have. His children may be torn from his arms
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and placed in a pest house. (Hoverty vs. Bass, 66 Me. 71.) And in
no case does he have anything in the nature of an effective remedy.
The courts usually justify their decisions as to the remediless
position of the individual in these cases by calling attention to the
necessity of haste, and the consequent impossibility of providing
a hearing. The argument is valid with regard to cases of infectious
disease, impure food, and a series of similar matters. It is not valid,
however, in cases such as the reconstruction of buildings which, when
erected, conformed to the law. But in such cases it is commonly
the rule that no hearing is either provided by law or granted by
police authorities. Cases are too common where orders are issued
by health or other police authorities, compliance with which involves
the expenditure of large amounts of money, where the house owner
has never had the slightest opportunity to be heard and first learns
of the proceedings through the service on him of the order. Instances, furthermore, are not uncommon where the order is accompanioed with a list of firms who will be glad to compete for the contract necessitated by the doing of the work called for by the order.
Practically the only effective remedy which the individual has
in these cases is an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the
nuisance removal order. In these injunction proceedings a number
of questions may be raised. In the first place, the constitutionality
of the law under which action is being taken may be inquired into.
In this respect the judicial control is, in my opinion, as I have indicated, too extensive, since as a result legislative discretion is subject
to review. In the second place, where the action complained of is
not clearly within the authority of an admittedly constitutional
statute, its reasonableness may be questioned. This is as it should
be if no other means of review is provided.
The appeal thus provided against the reasonableness of administrative action is not, however, nearly so effective as it appears to be
at first blush.
Its ineffectiveness is due in part to the fact that courts do not
care, for fear of a flood of litigation, to entertain any but the most
aggravated cases. Furthermore, these cases come before them, to
an extent at any rate, prejudged, although the complainant may not
have had, and usually has not had, his day in court. He must, there-
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fore, make out a very strong case in order to obtain relief. Finally,
these cases are rather technical in character and outside of the ken
of judges whose main work is the application of the rules of law governing the relations of private individuals, one with another.
I have said that the only practical remedy is the injunction. It
is, of course, true that the individual deeming himself aggrieved
in those cases has, theoretically at any rate, the right to sue the offending administrative officer for trespass after the order complained
of has been enforced, and that where disobedience of an administrative order is punishable criminally he may refuse to obey the order
and, when prosecuted, put up his defense. In both these cases about
the same questions may be raised as may be raised in the case of the
injunction. As a matter of fact, however, the civil remedy in damages is of little practical use. Judgments against officers rarely have
any great pecuniary value. As for the defense in criminal proceedings, while it may be desirable that it be available, it is not, any more
than the action in damages, of great practical value. For few people
like to take the risk of criminal proceedings.
Finally, in both the civil action in damages, and in criminal
proceedings, the attitude of the court, certainly so far as the legal
questions raised are concerned, is about the same as in the case of
injunctions. The case comes to the court prejudiced. The only
amelioration of the lot of the individual is to be found in the attitude of the jury, which is apt, as has been said, to consider private
rights rather than social interest.
vstrative Derisions Affecting Privileges.
3. Admin,
So far we have confined our consideration to cases where private
rights have been involved. There is, however, a large number of
very important cases where privileges, as the law regards them,
rather than rights, are in question.
Most of the cases involving privileges, the exercise of which is
dependent upon administrative decisions, have probably arisen under the federal government. There is, however, one rather large
class of cases which are regulated by state law. These cases have to
do for the most part with licenses which permit the individual to do
what would be illegal did he not possess such a license.
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In general, there are two lines of decisions in the states with
regard to this matter. One holds that the legislature may not constitutionally provide that the grant of a license to do a thing which,
without such a license, would be illegal, shall rest in the arbitrary
discretion of an administrative authority. These decisions hold that
the legislature must lay down in advance the conditions which must
be present in order that a license may or may not be issued, and
declare unconstitutional license laws which do not contain such conditions.
The other line of decisions takes the contrary view and regards
as proper laws which place the licensing power in the discretion of
administrative authorities. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court adhere to this view. (Wilson vs. Eureka City, 173 U. S.
32.) They hold that the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment is present where administrative authorities have
complete discretion in license matters.
The protection accorded the individual by the first line of decisions is not, however, nearly so great as it would at fust appear
to be. For there has not as yet been developed in our law an effective remedy against the use of discretionary power by administrative officers through the exercise of their power to render mere
decisions. It is, of course, true that under the first line of decisions
no person can be criminally punished for acting without a license
where a statute which requires a license attempts to give complete
discretion to licensing authorities. That is, he may transact the business without a license and, when prosecuted, set up as a defense
the unconstitutionality of the law requiring it. But it is to be remembered that where administrative discretion in the issue of licenses
is in theory limited, there is seldom an effective remedy where the
license is refused, because of the decision of the licensing authority
that the conditions necessary for the grant of the license are not present. Thus, take the case of liquor licenses which are to be granted only
to persons of good moral character, or on the application of a certain number of reputable persons. The refusal of the issuing authority to grant the license because of the character of the applicant or his sponsors is seldom if ever reviewable by the courts. (See
Devin vs. Belt, 70 Md. 352; United States ex rel. Roop vs. Douglas,
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19 D. C. 99.) Take, again, the case of the grant of a license to practise medicine or dentistry to every graduate of a reputable medical
or dental college. The refusal to grant the license to a person on the
ground that he is not the graduate of a reputable institution may not
usually be judicially reviewed. (People ex rel. Sheppard vs. State
Board,.etc., 110 Ill. 180.) Indeed, it may be said that almost the only
cases in which the state courts will review the determinations of
licensing autlorities are where those determinations are clearly opposed to the admitted facts, or have without question been made as
the result of the abuse of discretion. Such cases as have been decided, furthermore, have come up commonly on demurrer which
has admitted the alleged abuse of discretion. (See Illinois Board,
etc., vs. People ex rel. Cooper, 123 Ill. 227.)
The courts have exhibited this reluctance to exercise a control
over the discretion of licensing authorities in the issue of licenses.
although it is seldom the case that licensing laws provide for anything
in the nature of a formal hearing for the applicant for a license.
In the case, however, of the revocation of a license other than
a liquor license, the courts usually insist that the person whose license is to be revoked must have a formal hearing. (City of Lowell
vs. Archambault, 189 Mass. 70.) There is a case in the New York
courts, however, which holds that a license to sell milk could be re.
yoked without notice or a hearing. (Metropolitan Milk and Cream
Co. vs. City of New York, 113 App. Div. 377.) But the facts showed
that the person whose license had been revoked had been several
times convicted for selling impure milk. The court, therefore, refused
him a peremptory mandamus to compel the licensing authority to rescind its action in revoking the license.
I have said that the most important cases with regard to privileges have come up in connection with legislative acts of the federal
government.
These eases have had to do with the immigration of aliens, the
importation of forbidden products, the public lands, military pensions, and the use of the mails. The United States Supreme Court
has in its decisions recognized a very large power of uncontrolled
discretion in administrative offices. It has thus accorded to administrative officers the right finally to determine whether an alien immi-
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grant may lawfully enter the United States (Nishimura Ekin vs.
United States, 142 U. S. 651), whether imported teas come up to the
required standard (Buttfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470), whether
a person of Chinese race was born in the United States and is, therefore, a citizen (United States vs. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253), whether a
person is making unlawful use of the mails (Bates & Guild Co. vs.
Payne, "99 U. S. 106; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne, 194 U. S.
497), and whether clearance papers shall be issued to a vessel sailing
from a United States port where it is alleged that the officers of such
vessel have violated a law of the United States and refused on demand to pay the fine appended by law to such violation (Oceanic
Steamship Co. vs. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320.)
Almost the only instances in which the Supreme Court has not
regarded as final the action of administrative officers acting in these
cases are where they have exceeded their jurisdiction, e. g., by attempting to exclude as an alien one who was not an alien (Gonzalez vs.
Williams, 192 U. S. 1), or by denying to a person the use of the mails
for a reason not provided for in the law (Magnetic School of Healing
vs. MeAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94.) In some of the eases the court has
recognized the finality of the administrative determination as to
mixed questions of law and fact as well as to mere questions of fact.
(Public Clearing House vs. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497.)
The result of c
investigation would seem to be, then, tliat
although under the American law individuals may be more than'
amply protected in their rights against unconstitutional legislative
action, they are very largely left to the tender mercies of administrative discretion in the case not only of their privileges, but as well
of the rights recognized as theirs by the constitutional bills of rights.
American law has not as yet devised effective remedies against administrative discretion. Nor has it provided a system of administrative
procedure in -these matters which assures to the individual a hearing
before orders are issued, compliance with which involves the incurring
of great expense.
The unfortunate position in which the individual is placed over
against administrative authorities is a continual source of corruption. Where he has no right to a hearing and no effective judicial
remedy, it is almost certain that there will be many cases in which
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the inspectors upon whose report orders to be summarily executed
are issued will be paid to report conditions not as they are, or will
extort- blaekmail from the individual before they will report those
conditions as they are. The danger is all the greater in this country because of the incapacity and lack of character of many of the
employees in the civil service of our cities, where the conditions
are such as to demand more than elsewhere administrative regulation and control.
The unfortunate position in which our people are thus placed
is one in which they should not be placed. It is due to the primitive
character of our legal system. In both England and on the Continent
the change in social conditions which has taken place in the last century has resulted in the adoption of proper administrative procedure
and of adequate judicial remedies. A study of the recent development of the administrative law of Europe would reveal the fact that
we have much to learn as-to the protection of private rights from countries like France and Germany. The law of these countrie has not,
it is true, subjected in any large measure legislative discretion to
judicial control. It has, however, given to the individual a protection
against the arbitrary exercise of administrative discretion for which
we look to our.law in vain.
What has been said is particularly true of the French law, which
,has, through the r e@t decisions of the Council of State-the highest
of the special administrative courts-the peculiar contribution of
France to the science of administrative law-a remedy against administrative action which surpasses in effectiveness any remedy which
can be found in other legal systems.
It is greatly to be regretted that in our system of legal education
there would appear to be at the present time no place for the seriouq
study and investigation of these and similar legal problems. Whai
seems to be needed is that somewhere in the United States, preferably
in connection with some one of our universities, there should be es.
tablished a school or department not for the education of lawyer,
for the practise of the law, but for the study of jurisprudence, it
which greater attention might be given than is now possible to the
solution of the many legal and political problems which the greal
'changes in our economic and social life 'are with increasing empbas,
bringing to our attention.

